GIASP

VICTORIA DE SADR: DIRECCIÓN POLÍTICA DE IRAQ/ Sadr’s victory: Political direction of Iraq

La victoria en Iraq en las pasadas elecciones parlamentarias se esperaba favorable al Al Abadi tras su política de unidad, la resolución del referéndum kurdo y de lucha contra el Daesh; no obstante, poco se percibió el eje principal de descontento social en Iraq: la corrupción, la creciente influencia extranjera (norteamericana e iraní) y la necesidad de crecimiento económico para ofrecer salidas laborables y una situación de estabilidad. Que el clérigo e influyente chií Sadr ganase las elecciones políticas en coalición con el eje comunista del país ha dejado paso a una situación de influencia política más equilibrada en el país aunque con un despertar de tensiones crecientes y con un Daesh aún no desaparecido.  Se  valora como probable (70%) que en Iraq no se pueda limitar la influencia militar de Irán y Estados Unidos, ya que los sitios en el parlamento están equilibradamente repartidos, aunque Irán seguirá siendo el gran vencedor ante el creciente posicionamiento chií en el país y por influencia de la geopolítica en la región (con la vecina Siria). Se espera, por ello, que aumente la fricción ante esa oposición a la presencia e influencia iraní (a través de las milicias chiíes PMU, que aún juegan un papel fundamental y casi independiente en el país) y esos grupos minoritarios y desfavorecidos (suníes descontentos y kurdos revolucionarios), que incrementará la inestabilidad sociopolítica del país.

  1. IRAQ SE INCLINA HACIA EL EJE SUNÍ PARA EQUILIBRAR LA BALANZA SOCIAL: La victoria de Sadr en las elecciones parlamentarias de Iraq no supondrán un choque radical en la situación geopolítica de Iraq, aunque sí influirá en el control de la presencia político-militar extranjera en el país, poniendo un equilibrio entre el dominio de las milicias chiíes y el eje suní. Se valora como poco probable (40%) que se avance hacia un equilibrio suní-chií en el país debido a la geopolítica en la región, la influencia político-militar y social de la fuerza política chií pro-iraní y la creciente tensión étnica entre suníes y chiíes.
  1. IRAQ SE LIBERARÁ DE LA PRESENCIA MILITAR EXTRANJERA: Sadr representa la resistencia a las fuerzas militares extranjeras (y principalmente estadounidenses). Podría suponer el fin de la libertad de movimiento militar norteamericano entre la frontera de Iraq y Siria (para apoyar las fuerzas kurdas en la región) pero esto podría facilitar un mayor protagonismo de las fuerzas regionales y la coordinación entre países para la defensa fronteriza. Se valora como poco probable (40%) que se reduzca demasiado la influencia extranjera en el país, aunque obligará a un diálogo entre la Administración norteamericana y su eterno enemigo en Iraq (Sadr) para coordinar las acciones en Siria-Iraq y la lucha contra Daesh, pero aumentará el nivel de coordinación político-militar entre los actores regionales (Turquía, Siria, Iraq, Jordania e Irán).

The political victory in Iraq in the last parliamentary elections was expected in favor of Al Abadi after his policy of unity, his resolution of the Kurdish referendum and the struggle against Daesh; however, little was perceived as the main axis of the social discontent in Iraq: the corruption, the growing foreign influence and the need for economic growth to offer work opportunities and a stable situation. The cleric and influential Shia Sadr won the political elections in coalition with the communist axis of the country and that has brought a situation of more balanced political influence in the country, although with an awakening of growing social tensions and with a Daesh not yet disappeared. It is assessed as probable (70%) that in Iraq, the military influence of Iran and the United States can not be limited, since the seats in the parliament are evenly distributed, although Iran will continue to be the great winner in view of the growing Shiite position in the country and by its geopolitical influence in the region (such in Syria). It is hoped, therefore, that friction will increase in the face of this opposition to Iranian presence and influence (through the Shiite PMU militias, which still play a fundamental and almost independent role in the country) and those minority and disadvantaged groups (disgruntled Sunnis and revolutionary Kurds), which will increase the socio-political instability of the country.

  1. IRAQ TOWARDS THE SUNI AXIS TO BALANCE THE SOCIAL BALANCE: Sadr’s victory in Iraq’s parliamentary elections will not be a radical clash in Iraq’s geopolitical situation, although it will influence the control of the foreign political-military presence in Iraq, striking a balance between the domination of the Shia militias and the Sunni axis. It is assessed as unlikely (40%) a progress towards a Sunni-Shia equilibrium in the country due to geopolitics in the region, the political-military and social influence of the pro-Iranian Shia political force and the growing ethnic tension between Sunnis and Shiites.
    • (NOCLASS) On May 18, after the election results, Sadr convened a meeting of ambassadors of the region where the role of Iran was relegated. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, Kuwait and Jordan attended the meeting. Except Syria, the rest of the countries present themselves as a clear opposition to Iranian influence.
    • (NOCLASS) Sadr seeks a nationalist and independent Shia influence from Iran. To form a government, Sadr has asked for an alliance to the Shiite force Movimiento Hikma (led by Ammar al Hakim), the only political union of a Shiite branch free of ties with Iran [1]. Sadr and Al Abadi have agreed to work together to form a Coalition [2].
    • (NOCLASS) Sadr has given 48 hours to Suleimani, head of the Al Quds Force of Iran in Iraq, to leave the Iraqi territory. [3]
    • (NOCLASS) Sadr’s political party will occupy 54 seats in Parliament, but 47 seats will remain occupied by the political force led by Shiite militias in the country (which have the influence and control of Iran), while Al Abadi still has a significant weight in the chamber with 42 seats [4].
    • (NOCLASS) The big loser in Iraq has been the Sunni bloc, after the war with Daesh and the growing Shiite population and influence in the country, so Iran and the Shiites (as the country’s second political force) will continue to have greater influence in Iraq . The Sunni and Turkmen population will have little political positioning for decision-making in Iraq, although Sadr will seek to balance that by including the Kurdistan bloc (KRG) in his Coalition to favor Turkey and take into account the Kurdish political-social weight [5].
    • (NOCLASS) There have been protests in Kirkuk by Turkmen, Kurdish and Arab population that announce that the results in the elections have been manipulated in favor of the PUK [6] (55% did not vote in the elections).
  2. IRAQ WILL BE RELEASED FROM FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE: Sadr represents resistance to foreign (and mainly American) military forces. It could mean the end of the freedom of American military movement between the Iraqi and Syrian border (to support Kurdish forces in the region) but this could facilitate a greater role for regional forces and coordination between countries for border defense. It is considered as unlikely (40%) that the foreign influence in the country would be reduced too much, although it could force a dialogue between the US Administration and its eternal enemy in Iraq (Sadr) to coordinate the actions in Syria-Iraq and the fight against Daesh, but it would increase the level of political-military coordination among the regional actors (Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Iran).
    • (NOCLASS) Cleric Sadr will insist on the withdrawal of American troops and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards of Iraq [7].
    • (NOCLASS) Turkey has expanded its military action on Iraqi soil (in the north of the country) to combat Kurdish PKK forces near the Qandil mountains, but Iraq will not favor Ankara in its war against PKK nor facilitate its military intervention on Iraqi soil.
    • (NOCLASS) Daesh terrorism is evolving towards another identity taking advantage of power and security gaps and social discontent towards the Shiite predominance in the country.
    • (NOCLASS) Trump has promised the return of troops home from Syria, which could then affect also to US troops in Iraq.

 

MARTA Gª OUTÓN

SOURCES:

[1] http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/18052018

[2] https://www.dailysabah.com/mideast/2018/05/20/iraqi-pm-abadi-sadr-meet-in-sign-of-possible-coalition

[3] http://www.alqurtasnews.com/news/291487/alqurtasnews-news/ar

[4] http://www.france24.com/en/20180519-cleric-moqtada-sadr-wins-iraq-election-but-forming-government-far-off?ref=tw_i

[5] https://ahvalnews2.com/iraq/nationalist-sadrs-iraq-election-wins-surprises-regional-rivals

[6] http://www.anews.com.tr/world/2018/05/18/iraqi-turkmen-in-kirkuk-declare-hunger-strike-over-poll

[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/17/world/middleeast/pentagon-future-iraq-election-sadr.html

[8] Iraqiinfo_eng; TWITTER

[9] https://ahvalnews2.com/iraq/nationalist-sadrs-iraq-election-wins-surprises-regional-rivals