GIASP

ENFRENTAMIENTOS ENTRE MILICIAS ÉTNICAS EN EL SAHEL, DESAFÍO DE SEGURIDAD/ Clashes between ethnic militias in the Sahel, security challenge

Desde finales del 2017 y principios del 2018 se han incrementado las acciones violentas en área central de Mali y la frontera con Níger ante el crecimiento de milicias armadas que pretenden representar los intereses de los diferentes grupos tribales del área y su seguridad. Encontramos un conflicto de nivel «infra-tribal» sobre todo entre los grupos que disputan un espacio común en la frontera entre Mali y Níger. La multiplicación de estos grupos armados demuestra cómo de lejanos están el proceso de paz nacional y la acción internacional de los intereses étnicos y comunitarios, así como la continua situación de inseguridad, a pesar de los esfuerzos internacionales y las alianzas interregionales por frenar el avance del yihadismo y el crimen organizado.

NATURALEZA DEL CONFLICTO  Debido al impacto del cambio climático en la región y la extensión de los conflictos étnicos y regionales, la zona de la orilla del río Níger (que discurre principalmente por la región Mopti de Mali, hacia el sur por Bamako y hacia Níger, por Gao) se convierte en el principal escenario de enfrentamientos por el control y protección de la economía de subsistencia y de las comunidades étnicas-tribales de la zona. La pérdida de la región central de Mali (Mopti y Sègou) en manos de grupos terroristas supondría un golpe económico importante para el país y la estabilidad de la región.

ACELERADORES DEL PROBLEMA – La multiplicación de las milicias de legítima defensa no es otra que la consecuencia de la incapacidad del Estado para asegurar las poblaciones y sus bienes. Y el hecho de que el G5 Sahel todavía no está en funcionamiento explica la elección pragmática de asociarse con las milicias comunitarias. Al confiar la lucha antiterrorista a las milicias que emanan de las comunidades, se ha acelerado el problema entre comunidades y diferentes tribus en disputa por el dominio territorial y su actividad económica, así como las brechas de alianzas con los grupos yihadistas operando sobre el terreno.

PRINCIPALES MILICIAS Y SU PRESENCIA EN LA REGIÓN –La situación cada vez más precaria y violenta en el centro de Mali y la frontera con Níger queda lejos de las discusiones nacionales por la paz y ante la falta de atención y presencia gubernamental y de seguridad, están aumentando los grupos armados locales en defensa de sus propias comunidades y en respuesta a injusticias y violencia sin atención y respuesta nacional e internacional.


Since the end of 2017 and the beginning of 2018 the violent actions in the central area of Mali and the border with Niger have increased due to the growth of armed militias that pretend to represent the interests of the different tribal groups of the area and their security. We found a conflict of «infra-tribal» level, especially among the groups that dispute a common space on the border between Mali and Niger. The multiplication of these armed groups demonstrates how distant are the national peace process and the international action of the ethnic and community interests, as well as the continuous situation of insecurity, despite international efforts and interregional alliances to halt the advance of the jihadism and organized crime.

NATURE OF THE CONFLICT Due to the impact of climate change in the region and the spread of ethnic and regional conflicts, the zone of the Niger river bank (which runs mainly through the Mopti region of Mali, to the south through Bamako and towards Niger through Gao) becomes the main scenario of confrontations for the control and protection of the subsistence economy and of the ethnic-tribal communities in the area. The loss of the central region of Mali (Mopti and Sègou) into the hands of terrorist groups would be a major economic blow to the country and the stability of the region.
• (NOCLASS) NIGER: The Niger region has suffered a long time of marginalization, underdevelopment and lack of economic investment, lack of governance and ethnic discrimination that has led to social discontent and the formation and support of extremist groups and jihadist militias .
• (NOCLASS) MALI: The central region of Mali (Mopti and Sègou) is the main producer of the economy of the country (agriculture and livestock especially), where are the main breeding areas for the livestock sector and the main connections with the communication and water routes.
• (DL) Conflicts between breeders and Tuaregs in the area have a decades-long history, punctuated by murders and robberies of thousands. They are structurally linked to the transformations of the political economy and the weakness of border governance.
• (DL) The Fulani are accused of supporting and joining the ranks of the main jihadist groups in the region (ISGS – ISIS, MUJAO, Ansar al Islam, Macina Front …). It is an ethnic group with nomadic and mainly pastoral characteristics, with religious affiliation with Islam that, due to its precarious survival situation, the regional ethnic discrimination and its historical past linked to the expansion of Islam, are of main attraction for the jihadist ideology.

ACCELERATORS OF THE PROBLEM – The multiplication of self-defense militias is due to the consequence of the inability of the State to secure the populations and their goods. And the fact that the Sahel G5 Force is not yet operational explains the pragmatic choice to partner with community militias. By entrusting the fight against terrorism to the militias that emanate from the communities, the problem has been accelerated between communities and different tribes in dispute over territorial domination and economic activity, as well as the breaches of alliances with the jihadist groups operating on the ground.
• (DL) Although the Fulani is the predominant language in the central region of Mali, the militias have taken advantage of their strength and ability to impose their order and hierarchy to achieve their local political-economic objectives.
• (NOCLASS) The areas of central Mali and the border with Niger have been abandoned by the central government since independence was claimed. For that, it suffers a situation of underdevelopment, lack of water, electricity and basic infrastructure.
• (NOCLASS) Many of the terrorist groups (based in the northern region of Tillabery de Niger) have exploited the precarious situation of the Fulani tribes to expand their influence in the area promising protection and economic support.
• (DL) The border is porous because national armies are weak. Once this evidence is established, it should be taken into account that it is the armed groups of the MSA and GATIA who are, in fact, the authorities in charge of security in the axis that goes from Menaka to the cross-border area of Mali. -Niger.
• (NOCLASS) The Mopti region is not considered by the Pheul community and the militias part of the Algiers Agreement of peace and national reconciliation.
• (DL) The spread of illicit activity and organized crime carried out by terrorist groups in the region has involved communities, which has widened conflicts and mafias in the area.

MAJOR MILICIAS AND THEIR PRESENCE IN THE REGION – The increasingly precarious and violent situation in the center of Mali and the Niger border is far from the national discussions for peace and, given the lack of government attention and presence and security, have increased local armed groups in defense of their own communities and in response to injustice and violence without national and international attention and response.
• (SINCLAS) The Fulani militias show great concern for the uncontrolled situation of insecurity that exists in the area between Mali and Niger, where the main jihadist groups are fighting for territorial domination and inter-community influence and where, in addition, with the resurgence of Armed militias representing the main tribal ethnic groups have increased the number of violent actions among civilians forcing further humanitarian displacement.
• (SYNCLAS) The Fulani militias have formed an alliance forming the SSA (Alliance for the Salvation of the Sahel), a protection force against marginalized communities and victims of attacks by other ethnic militias and terrorist groups (which focus their action against the Fulani who do not join their movement and ideology).
• (SYCLES) The SSA (Alliance for the Salvation of the Sahel) was formalized as an alliance between the main pheul militias to defend the Fulanis communities from the attacks of other ethnic militias (although it has the main clashes with the Dogon militias).
• (SINCLAS) The SSA has been formalized for 6 months by political and military leaders until they decided to establish this political-military movement to defend the Fulani and the marginalized communities in the north-east of Mali.
• (CLASSIFICATION) SSAs operate mainly in the area that covers Koro, Nampala, Bambara Maoudé and Boulikessi.
• (SYNCLAS) The main Dogon militia, DOZOS or Dana Ambassagou (Under the Protection of God), has been formalized before the existence of an armed Fulani alliance (SSA) and the extension of the jihadist groups in the area.
• (SINCLAS) DOZOS collaborates informally with governmental and national forces.
• (SYCLES) The majority of the members of this Dogon militia do not speak in the local language and not even Dogon, which shows the influence and interference of other actors in the regional and local conflict manipulated by interests.
• (SYCLES) The main Tuareg militias GATIA (Tuareg Imghad Self-Defense Force and allies, led by General Gamou) and MSA (Movement for the Salvation of Azawad, led by Daoussahak Moussa Ag Acharatoumane) operate collaboratively supported by force G5 Sahel in the area from Menaka to the northeast of Mali on the Niger border.

Marta Gª Outón

SOURCES

(C2) Manon Elissa Murray: “Macina: Mali’s second insurgency”, Ultima Ration, blog. 15/02/2918

(B1) Mohamed Maiga: “The center of Mali: an ecological, economic, sociological, cultural and cultic continuum in the process of disintegration?” Sahelien, 10/05/2017.

(C2) Marta Gª Outón; “La amenaza yihadista en el escenario Sahel-Magreb”, GIASP, 25/04/2017.

(D4) Alphajoe Al Jallow; “Attack against Fulani in Niger”, Fulani News Media, 01/01/2018

(B1) Nicolas Beau; “Mali, notre entretien avec un chef Peul armé”, Monda Afrique, 30/05/2018

(E3) “Le Pays Dogon sous la protection des fusils de chase”, Le Pays, 12/02/2018

(C2) Bokar Sangaré; “Sahel: le recours aux milices locales pour lutter contre le terrorisme envenime les conflits communautaires”, Justice Info, 25/05/2018

(A1) Jean-Hervé Jezequel y Hamza Cherbib; “Niger clash kills US and Nigerien troops”, Crisis Group, 05/10/2017

[1] http://ultimaratio-blog.org/archives/8676

[2] http://sahelien.com/en/the-center-of-mali-an-ecological-economic-sociological-cultural-and-cultic-continuum-in-the-process-of-disintegration/

[3] https://mondafrique.com/mali-notre-entretien-avec-le-chef-peul-dune-milice-armee/

[4] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/niger/niger-clash-kills-us-and-nigerien-troops

[5] https://mondafrique.com/mali-notre-entretien-avec-le-chef-peul-dune-milice-armee/

[6] https://intelgiasp.com/2017/04/25/la-amenaza-yihadista-en-el-escenario-del-magreb-y-el-sahel-jihadist-threat-in-the-magreb-sahel-scenario/

[7] https://www.fulaninewsmedia.com/index.php/home/news_description/35/Attack-against-Fulani-in-Niger

[8] https://mondafrique.com/mali-notre-entretien-avec-le-chef-peul-dune-milice-armee/

[9] Íbid.

[10] https://mondafrique.com/mali-notre-entretien-avec-le-chef-peul-dune-milice-armee/

[11] http://www.lepays.ml/edito-pays-dogon-protection-fusils-de-chasse/

[12] https://mondafrique.com/mali-notre-entretien-avec-le-chef-peul-dune-milice-armee/

[13] https://www.justiceinfo.net/fr/justice-reconciliation/37604-sahel-a-la-frontiere-mali-niger-il-y-a-une-absence-d-anticipation-des-effets-de-la-lutte-anti-terro.html