TRIDENT JUNCTURE y ESCENARIO MILITAR EN EL ÁREA DEL BÁLTICO-ÁRTICO/ Trident Juncture & the military scenario in the Baltic-Arctic area

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Trident Juncture (Octubre 25 – Noviembre 7) representa la mayor movilización de defensa en décadas por parte de la OTAN en la frontera báltica, con más de 50,000 participantes (14,000 de Estados Unidos) de 31 naciones con el fin de probar la fuerza de respuesta y la capacidad de coordinación de defensa de la Alianza. Noruega, que acoge el ejercicio, aportará unos 6.700, Reino Unido unos 3.700, Dinamarca 1.100, España con 2.000 e Italia, unos 1.500 y más de diez aviones.

La Alianza ha ido demostrando una subida en el gasto militar en los últimos años (un aumento de 30 mil millones desde 2016 por la presión de Donald Trump de alcanzar el 2% del PIB nacional de los países miembros en Defensa, únicamente logrado por USA, Grecia, Reino Unido[1] y Estonia y seguido muy de cerca por Polonia, al ser principal sede de posicionamiento de sistema de misiles de defensa de Estados Unidos en Europa del este y que además se ha ofrecido para acoger base permanente militar de su aliado –“Fort Trump”)[2], lo que demuestra de manera cierta una creciente militarización de Europa (principalmente de los aliados en Europa del este, zona báltica, pero cada vez más una mayor exigencia al flanco sur-mediterráneo, por la desestabilización socio-política provocada por el terrorismo, cambio climático y desafío poblacional, por los conflictos transfronterizos y la ampliación de maniobras ruso-chinas en la región africana).

Rusia enviará observadores (2 militares) al Ejercicio por invitación de la OTAN como parte de la invitación a miembros de la OSCE (la observación internacional es de 13.000 militares, según el Documento de Viena) con la intención de demostrar el ejercicio de defensa con total transparencia y limar situaciones tensas con el país vecino. La OTAN realiza ejercicios de gran escala y visibles cada tres años, no obstante, Rusia ha constatado que, tanto Estados Unidos como Reino Unido, han aumentado sus fuerzas militares en la zona escandinava (independientemente de las exigencias del ejercicio) ante la situación desafiante y estratégica del Ártico y los países Bálticos. Esta situación ha acrecentado de manera cierta la percepción de amenaza y de inseguridad, así como la necesidad de movimiento y respuesta de prevención y oportunidad, lo que ampliará la posibilidad de un escenario más militarizado en el norte de Europa y más inseguro en el sur del continente disparado por los cambios demográficos, socio-políticos y de cambio climático.

MILITARIZACIÓN DEL ÁREA BÁLTICA-ÁRTICA. Con la retirada de Estados Unidos del tratado INF, supondría una escalada de tensiones y un incremento del escenario bélico en esas áreas susceptibles al conflicto entre las principales potencias militares: Rusia, China y US (área del Pacífico, este europeo y Mar Báltico-Ártico). Además, con el desafío del cambio climático, la movilización militar rusa en el área del Báltico-Ártico, así como sus acciones ofensivas en el escenario cibernético, obligará a países nórdicos (hasta ahora de carácter más neutral en el pulso de influencia ruso-OTAN) a incrementar sus capacidades defensivas y ofensivas e incorporar sus fuerzas a actividades militares conjuntas. Se ve como probable que, ante movimientos de oposición a la militarización del área (por parte de la oposición política y grupos activistas), se aproveche la ruptura político-social por parte de terceros países y/o actores que busquen la desestabilización y la debilitación de la OTAN en esas zonas a través de la intromisión de actividades de influencia.

POSICIONAMIENTO RUSO EN EL ÁREA DEL BÁLTICO-ÁRTICO: Se ve como altamente probable, a pesar del impacto de la crisis económica (por las sanciones y la reducción del comercio con Ucrania y países de Europa) y la reducción del presupuesto en defensa, que Rusia continuará centrándose en el desarrollo de sistemas de gama alta que supondrán de enorme impacto para la percepción de seguridad de los países aliados de la OTAN y de Europa. La lucha por la influencia en la zona báltica-ártica, condicionada por el cambio climático, aumentará la presencia militar de Rusia en esa región por el potencial comercial y el desafío que supone para la seguridad con el fin de cumplir su objetivo de formalizar una fuerza armada rusa combinada desplegada en el Ártico para el 2020.

ESCALA DE INCERTIDUMBRE
AFIRMACION CUALITTIVA MARGEN DE PROBABIIDAD ASOCIADA
MUY POCO PROBABLE P
POCO PROBABLE 10
POSIBLE 25
PROBABLE 55
MUY PROBABLE 80
CASI SEGURO/CIERTO P>=90%

ANÁLISIS DE RELACIONES ENTRE ACTORES

Con el análisis de relaciones entre actores según sus capacidades y objetivos, advertimos en el área del Báltico-Ártico una trama de dos bandos claros donde los Países Bálticos y Finlandia (además de Suecia) se encuentras en el ámbito de influencia de la OTAN, de Rusia e de incluso China para conseguir los principales fines de posicionamiento estratégico, contención de la amenaza competitiva y acceso a recursos. La posición estratégica de Finlandia es fundamental para conseguir los objetivos de influencia de la OTAN mientras que la nación busca además en la Alianza el apoyo para la contención de amenazas y aumento de capacidades. China aparece como actor principal de apoyo económico y estratégico de Rusia -que actúa impulsado por la necesidad estratégica y económica- y, además, buscando el posicionamiento en las áreas de principales recursos económicos y potenciales para el mercado prospectivo a través de acuerdos bilaterales de comercio con los países de la región interesados en la estabilidad político-económica.

ANÁLISIS DE FACTORES Y VARIABLES DE INFLUENCIA

Según el análisis de variables principales y sus niveles de influencia sobre los factores de la trama, se advierte una estructura con factores altamente dependientes e influyentes entre ellos, donde se destaca lo siguiente:

  1. La estabilidad político-económica es un factor principalmente influyente a la hora de movilizar los juegos de posicionamiento estratégico de los actores en la zona.
  2. Las acciones que buscan el posicionamiento estratégico dependen del contexto de oportunidad y amenaza, donde la guerra de influencia -principalmente apoyadas por relaciones político-económicas, operaciones de influencia, explotación de recursos y aumento de capacidades militares y de seguridad– es el factor principal en el juego de posicionamiento entre actores.

Se advierte, por tanto, que el escenario ofrece un contexto de OPORTUNIDAD – Por las áreas estratégicas de acceso a recursos y a nuevos acuerdos económicos que apoyen la estabilidad político-social de los actores (principalmente afectados por la crisis económica, necesidad de aumento de capacidades y búsqueda de posicionamiento estratégico). Además, se advierte que el contexto de AMENAZA entre potencias (principalmente entre la OTAN y Rusia) viene promovido por un contexto de desestabilización político-social y económico (sobre el discurso de alienación política-militar y por las operaciones de influencia), afectado por además por el impacto de la economía y por el escenario de oportunidad que ofrece el área del Báltico-Ártico.

 

MARTA Gª OUTÓN


Trident Juncture (October 25 – November 7) represents the largest defense mobilization in decades by NATO in the Baltic border, with more than 50,000 participants (14,000 from the United States) from 31 nations in order to test the response force and the defense coordination capacity of the Alliance. Norway, which hosts the exercise, will contribute with 6,700, the United Kingdom with 3,700, Denmark with 1,100, Spain with 2,000 and Italy with 1,500 and more than ten aircraft.

The Alliance has been showing a rise in military spending in recent years (an increase of 30 billion since 2016 due to the pressure of Donald Trump to achieve 2% of the national GDP in defense of the member countries, only achieved by the USA, Greece, United Kingdom [1] and Estonia and closely followed by Poland, being the main location for positioning of the US missile defense system in Eastern Europe and which has also offered to host its military’s permanent military base – «Fort Trump») [2], which demonstrates in a certain way an increasing militarization of Europe (mainly of the allies in Eastern Europe, Baltic zone, but more and more a greater demand in the south-Mediterranean flank due to the socio-politic destabilization caused by terrorism, climate change and population challenge, cross-border conflicts and the expansion of Russian-Chinese maneuvers in the African region).

Russia will send observers (2 military) to the Exercise invitated by NATO as part of the invitation to OSCE members (the international observation is 13,000 military, according to the Vienna Document) with the intention of demonstrating the defense exercise with total transparency and filing tense situations with the neighboring country. NATO carries out large-scale and visible exercises every three years, however, Russia has found that both the United States and the United Kingdom have increased their military forces in the Scandinavian zone (regardless of the exigencies of the exercise) in the face of the challenging situation and of the Arctic and the Baltic countries. This situation has increased in a certain way the perception of threat and insecurity, as well as the need for movement and response of prevention and opportunity, which will expand the possibility of a more militarized scenario in northern Europe and more insecure in the south of the country. continent triggered by demographic, socio-political and climate change changes.

MILITARIZATION OF THE BALTIC-ÁRTICA AREA. With the withdrawal of the United States from the INF treaty, it would mean an escalation of tensions in those areas susceptible to conflict between the main military powers: Russia, China and the US (Pacific area, Eastern Europe and Baltic-Arctic Sea)). In addition, with the challenge of climate change, the Russian military mobilization in the Baltic-Arctic area, as well as its offensive actions in the cybernetic scenario, will force the Nordic countries (more neutral in the pulse of Russian-NATO influence) to increase their defensive and offensive capabilities and to incorporate their forces into joint military activities. It is seen as probable that, faced with movements opposed to the militarization of the area (by the political opposition and activist groups), political-social rupture will be seized by third countries and / or actors seeking destabilization and weakening NATO in those areas through the intrusion of influence activities.
• Trump announces the withdrawal of the INF treaty (held since the Reagan administration to contain militarization after the Cold War) to face the Chinese threat in the Pacific, which would leave the possibility of increasing the militarization in the Baltic in hands of the competition (Russia) establishing intermediate range missiles. However, it is a treaty that for a long time has little commitment to the main weapons powers, violated several times by Russia (as noted by the Obama administration when Putin created the land-based cruise missile, the SSC-8 and later, in 2017, 9M729) and without any obligation on China. In the absence of official and public evidence demonstrating the justification for this decision, it is clear that Trump seeks the excuse and not so much the need.
• Swedish and Finnish units will form a brigade to support NATO, breaking its neutrality situation since the Cold War (250 members will participate from Finland). The objective of Finland’s participation is to strengthen national defense capacity (by increasing its naval strength in the face of the defense and security challenge of the Baltic Sea, the Gulf of Bothnia and the Arctic) and to improve international interoperability.
• The reinforcement of the Finnish naval force in the Baltic Sea is being carried out within the framework of the 1.5 billion dollar Squadron Program with the objective of acquiring four corvettes, icebreaker submarines with their systems of control and armament from the hand of three Canadian companies (Saab, Atlas Electronik and Lockheed Martin Canada) and contracts to acquire the Israeli system of Gabriel missiles (MBDA (EXOCET), Kongsberg (NSM), Boeing (Harpoon) and Saab (RBS15 )).
• On the other hand, there is growing concern on the part of Finland of the cyber threat and the expansion of this domain in the Russian offensives; Finland supports the need for greater defense cooperation in this area of those nations that share the same values in defense of democracy, which is why Helsinki hosts the European Center for Excellence to Counter the Hybrid Threat supported by NATO, which has received funds and resources from the United States, Great Britain, France and the Nordic States. Historically, too, Finland suffered Soviet pressure during the Cold War with offensive and defensive military expansionism at its territorial borders.
• The challenging (and growing) scenario due to the influence games between NATO and Russia, the maritime scenario of the Baltic Sea and the Arctic zone, which reappears as a strategic economic and military area with climate change and the cyber war) has increased the concern of the Baltic countries and forced to increase spending on defense by Sweden and Finland, which have been changing their policy of non-alienation after the Cold War, warning the need to expand their capabilities and improve their cooperation in defense and security.
• However, in spite of the geostrategic changes and the new challenges to security and defense in the Baltic, there have been increases in opposition movements and above all in the leftist line to the militarization of the area and its approach to NATO ; In Norway, protest movements have been mobilized for the 27th in Bergen, Kristiansand and Oslo.

• The Naval exercise in the Baltic Sea, Northern Coasts 18 (NOCO18) will be held jointly with the Trident Juncture, led and hosted by Finland, between October 28 and November 8 and will have the participation of 4,000 troops (from Finland, Sweden, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Canada, Poland, the United States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in order to train combined naval international operations at the unit and command level in all fields of naval warfare and to improve the interoperability of multinational units, especially when operating in coastal conditions, being the Gulf of Bothnia, the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland major Russian submarine maneuvering area and strategic area for the Baltic and the Arctic.

RUSSIAN POSITIONING IN THE BALTIC-ARCTIC AREA: It is seen as highly probable, despite the impact of the economic crisis (due to the sanctions and the reduction of trade with Ukraine and European countries) and the reduction of the defense budget, that Russia will continue to focus on the development of high-end systems that will have an enormous impact on the perception of security in the allied NATO and European countries. The struggle for influence in the Baltic-Arctic region, conditioned by climate change, will increase Russia’s military presence in that region because of the commercial potential and the challenge it poses to security in order to fulfill its objective of formalizing a force combined Russian navy deployed in the Arctic by 2020.
• According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Russia has the following military potential: 313 intercontinental ballistic missiles; 2,780 main battle tanks, more than 5,140 infantry fighting armored vehicles, more than 6,100 armored personnel carriers and more than 4,328 artillery pieces. The navy has an aircraft carrier; 62 submarines (including 13 ballistic missile submarines); five cruises; 15 destroyers; 13 frigates; and 100 patrol boats and coastal fighters. The air force has 1,176 aircraft with combat capability. It also has 280,000 members of the army. Russia also has a total reserve force of 2,000,000 for all the armed forces. Russian deepwater research vessels include submarines with ballistic missiles, which have smaller auxiliary submarines that can operate on the ocean floor. In addition, Russia has deployed more and more paid private voluntary troops (Wagner Group company, strongly associated with the Presidency) trained in Special Forces bases and, often, under the command of the Russian Special Forces. Putin has selected 340,000 personnel for his National Guard (between civilians and military).

• Russia reduced the defense spending by 20% (from $ 70 billion in 2016 to $ 66.3 billion in 2017), although it has invested heavily in the modernization of its armed forces: in early 2018, Russia introduced the new State Armament Program 2018-2027 ($ 306 billion), focused on the acquisition of high precision weapons for air, sea and land combat (including hypersonic missiles, unmanned aerial attack complexes, individual military equipment and advanced reconnaissance systems , communication and electronic warfare, in addition to robotics). In addition, Russia’s nuclear arsenal has been progressively modernized – the Strategic Rocket Force (RVSN) and the acquisition of the RS-28 ballistic missile and the ICBM RS-28 (Satan 2) by 2021 as a replacement for the RS-36-.
• Russia has announced life extension programs for its Akula class and Oscar II class nuclear propulsion submarines, which operate in both the Northern and Pacific Fleets. Russia gives predominance to submarines as a naval force (it has expressed its ambition to produce a fifth generation stealth submarine by 2030 and arm it with hypersonic Zircon missiles).
• Although the naval industry has been the most affected due to the impact of the economic crisis and defense spending (tight budgets and the inability to obtain parts of the Ukrainian industry (gas turbine engines)).
• In September 2017, Russia and Belarus held Zapad 2017, a massive exercise in the Western Military District of Russia, Kaliningrad and Belarus with a force of 60,000 to 70,000, with 12,000 exercises throughout Belarus and the rest in Russia with a military mobilization that is not very transparent at the international level. In addition, during Zapad 17, Russia deployed Iskander missiles near the northern border of Norway affecting signal interference more than 150 miles from the Russian border, interrupting commercial aircraft routes and fishing and navigation vessels in the area.
• The Northern Fleet based in the Arctic represents two thirds of the Russian Navy. Two Arctic brigades have been formed and Russia plans to form Arctic Coast Defense divisions that will be under the command of the Northern Fleet and stationed on the Kola peninsula in Russia’s eastern Arctic. In addition, Russia is investing in military bases in the Arctic and operational airfields in the region along with deep-water ports with the S-300 radars and missiles location.
• In the last six months, new information has emerged about Russia’s progress in the development of a new type of weapon, the submarine nuclear drone Poseidon, which should enter service in the next decade (its range should reach 10,000 km) with strategic objective of the elimination of important objectives along the coast of the enemy and permanent pollution in huge areas.

 

ANALYSIS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ACTORS
With the analysis of relations between actors, according to their capacities and objectives, it is seen in the Baltic-Arctic area a plot of two clear sides where the Baltic States and Finland (besides Sweden) are in the NATO sphere of influence, while Russia and even China are to achieve the main goals of strategic positioning, containment of the competitive threat and access to resources. The strategic position of Finland is fundamental to achieve the influence objectives of NATO while the nation also seeks the military support in the Alliance for the containment of threats and its capacity building. China appears as main actor of economic and strategic support of Russia – which acts driven by strategic and economic need – and, furthermore, seeking positioning in the main economic areas and where are the main potential resources for the prospective market through bilateral trade agreements with the countries of the region interested in political-economic stability.

 

ANALYSIS OF INFLUENCE FACTORS AND VARIABLES
According to the analysis of main variables and their levels of influence on the factors of the plot, a structure with highly dependent and influential factors among them is noticed, where the following is highlighted.

 

MARTA Gª OUTÓN

BIBLIOGRAFÍA:

https://www.pscp.tv/w/1ypKdYdVjYdGW

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/10/19/finland-moves-to-boost-its-naval-power-in-the-baltic-sea-hotspot/

https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/assessing-threats-us-vital-interests/europe

https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russias-plans-arctic-supremacy

https://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-russias-militarization-of-arctic-2015-8?IR=T

https://limacharlienews.com/russia/russia-arctic-military-bases/